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This paper attempts to empirically explore the effects of trade liberalization process in 
Tunisia on average real wages and wage inequality, via industry rents. For this purpose, we 
adopt, following Revenga (1997), a flexible model of wage setting that can accommodate 
both the presence of rent-sharing behavior and competitive wage determination. The rent-
sharing mechanism may affect firms’ employment response to trade liberalization. Indeed, 
bargaining workers could accept a reduction in wages subsequent to rent dissipation in order 
to preserve jobs. We assess this hypothesis by regressing a labor demand function derived 
from a model of employment determination that integrates trade impacts, following Mouelhi 
(2007). 
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1.  Introduction  
 
 
The issue of trade and wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers has 
received increasing attention in recent economic literature. Most studies have been focusing 
on  developed  countries,  but  there  have  been  a  number  of  studies  on  developing  Latin 
American and Asian countries as well. The majority of them have found that trade reforms 
initiated  in  less-industrialized  countries  coincide  with  an  increase  in  wage  inequality. 
Explanations suggested are mainly related to skill premium increase driven by the raise of the 
relative demand of skilled workers. We can cite the skill-biased technological change (Hanson 
and Harrison, 1995; Görg and Ströbl, 2001, Pavcnik, 2003, Edwards, 2004) as well as the 
increase  of  FDI  flows  towards  developing  countries  and  the  shift  of  intermediate  goods 
production to the South (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996; Zhu and Trefler, 2005). However, trade 
liberalization contributes to wage inequality through other channels than the return to skill 
such as the industry wage premium. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) define it as “the portion of 
individual wages that cannot be explained by worker, firm, or job characteristics, but can be 




Industry  wage  differentials  may  be  relevant  in  predicting  the  impact  of  trade 
liberalization  under  different  assumptions.  This  is  likely,  first,  in  short  and  medium-run 
models of trade where labour market rigidities prevent workers free movement across sectors. 
Second,  industry  wage  premiums  may  take  the  form  of  industry  rents  in  trade  models 
introducing imperfect competition and rent sharing
ii. Finally, trade liberalization could affect 
industry wages through productivity enhancements if these gains are transmitted to workers, 
(Harrison, 1994). While trade theory offers many rationales to the industry wage premiu m 
channel, only few empirical studies have investigated it in the case of developing countries. 
We can mention for example Revenga (1997), Currie and Harrison (1997), Feliciano (2001), 
Attanasio et al. (2004), Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005).    3 
This paper is particularly interested in the impact of trade liberalization in Tunisia on 
the  rent  component  of  the  industry  wage  premium.  Many  studies  on  Latin  American 
developing  countries  report  that  under  import  substitution,  governments  largely  protected 
unskilled-labour  intensive  sectors
iii, which seems at first glance paradoxical, given their 
comparative advantage pattern (Hanson and Harrison, 1999; Pavcnik et al., 2004; Attanasio et 
al., 2004). Explanations provided by the literature to such a puzzle are related to political 
economy considerations. Indeed, the structure of wage protection in these countries may be 
more  correlated  to  the  political  process  than  to  the  notion  of  comparative  advantage. 
Furthermore, Marktanner (2000) demonstrates, though for developed countries, that it may be 
more politically reasonable to use trade policy than income redistribution to counteract rising 
income inequality resulting from globalization.  
 
 
           Protection-induced  industry  rents  coupled  with  rent  sharing  agreements  allowed 
workers in these unskilled-labour intensive sectors to benefit from wages higher than the 
market rate. To the extent that these sectors were also relatively the most affected by trade 
reforms, we would expect these changes to translate into unskilled workers relative income. 
This, in turn, affects skilled-unskilled wage differentials.  
 
For  this  purpose,  we  adopt,  following  Revenga  (1997),  a  flexible  model  of  wage 
setting that can accommodate both the presence of rent-sharing behavior and competitive 
wage determination. However, our empirical approach differs in that instead of confining the 
analysis to the assessment of trade openness effects on average real wage through industry 
rents, we attempt to estimate them for different types of workers (skilled and unskilled) and 
firms (skill-intensive and unskilled labour-intensive). This enables us, firstly, to better take 
into consideration the heterogeneity in bargaining power and the ability to capture rents across 
firms. Secondly, it makes possible to conclude about the implications of rent evolution on 
wage inequality.    4 
Additionally  to  its  distributional  effects,  rent  sharing  may  also  have  significant 
macroeconomic  implications.  As  pointed  out  by  Martins  (2007),  it  reduces  employment 
fluctuations if in periods of lower profits, firms are able to restrain the rents shared with 
workers during periods of greater prosperity. Therefore, in such cases, we may expect that 
economic  shocks  as  the  dismantling  of  trade  barriers  will  lead  to  wage  adjustments  and 
relatively small employment shifts. Interestingly, this gives the echo to findings of recent 
studies on the employment effects of trade liberalization in developing countries. Currie and 
Harrison (1997) come upon small employment responses to tariff and quotas reductions in 
Morocco.  Revenga  (1997)  and  Feliciano  (2001)  present  similar  evidences  concerning  the 
impacts of trade reforms on the Mexican labour market. Puzzled by such results, these authors 
investigated several explanations related notably to the existence of labour market rigidities as 
important  hiring  and  firing  costs  and  minimum  wage  legislation.  However,  two  relevant 
plausible reasons emerge from the empirical analysis. In Mexico, where 30% of the labour 
force is unionized, Ana Revenga finds that most of the adjustment to trade reform occurred 
through  wage  reductions.  The  fall  in  real  wages  was  greater  in  firms  where  rent-sharing 
arrangements had allowed workers to benefit from higher protection. For Morocco, it appears 
that labour has no significant market power. Hanson and Harrison (1999) explain that capital 
did not share the rents under protection with workers which constrained it to bear a large 
fraction of the costs of adjustment after trade liberalization. Currie and Harrison (1997) show 
that this was made by cutting profit margins (lowering prices)
iv.  
 
In the light of these findings, it would be frustrating not to explore the effects of rent 
sharing on the Tunisian employment response to trade openness. Such an investigation would 
enable us to have a comprehensive knowledge about the way Tunisian firms have adjusted to 
such reforms. We are interested to identify whether it was through rents, and hence wages 
decline, or employment losses, or both responses? For this purpose, we consider a dynamic   5 
model of employment determination which incorporates trade effects, desegregates the labour 
demand depending on skill and takes into account the existence of adjustment costs, following 
Mouelhi (2007).  
 
 
Overall, this paper is motivated by two objectives. The first objective is to empirically 
explore the effects of trade liberalization process in Tunisia on average real wages and wage 
inequality, through industry rent changes. This rent is, thus, apprehended as a channel through 
which trade liberalization impacts skilled-unskilled wage differentials. The second concern is 
to investigate the employment effects of trade reforms providing a complete scheme about the 
pattern of labor market responses. 
 
We perform the entire empirical analysis using a firm level database drawn from the 
national annual survey report on firms (NASRF) provided by the Tunisian National Institute 
of  Statistics  (TNIS).  The  annual  data  cover  635  firms  from  manufacturing  and  non 
manufacturing sectors during the period 1998-2002. We consider this period as an interesting 
episode to capture wage and employment effects of trade reforms. Indeed, economic impacts 
of the numerous measures that have been carried by Tunisia to further liberalize trade, since 
1987, were generally not enough perceptible before 1998.  
 
Results suggest that skill-intensive Tunisian firms’ response to trade policy changes 
transited mainly only through quasi-rent reduction. However, unskilled-labour intensive firms 
adjusted by increasing labour demand. Two more inter-related findings deserve interest: 1- 
Skilled labour was more able than unskilled labour to capture rents before trade reforms. 2- 
Hence, the reduction of rents appears to have reduced wage inequality between skilled and 
unskilled labour, over the period 1998-2002 in Tunisia.  
 
 
This paper is organised as follows: section 2 discusses the literature on industry wage 
premiums.  Section  3  focuses  on  the  link  between  trade  liberalisation  and  industry  wage   6 
premiums. Section 4 emphasizes the potential implications of a rent-sharing behaviour on 
firms’ employment responses. Section 5 describes the Tunisian trade liberalization process 
and gives some evidences concerning rent-sharing in the Tunisian context. Section 6 lays 
down the database used and the framework of the empirical analysis as well as the main 
econometric results. Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. The literature on industry wage premiums 
 
Many  empirical  studies  have  demonstrated  that  workers  with  comparable  human 
capital  and  job  characteristics  can  nevertheless  earn  different  wages  depending  on  their 
industry  affiliation.  The impact  that this  membership may  exert on the worker’s  wage is 
defined  as  the  industry  wage  premium.  A  variety  of  explanations  related  to  these  wage 
differentials is reported by authors as Dickens and Katz (1987), Katz et al. (1989), Krueger 
and Summers (1988), Groshen (1991) and Mishra and Kumar (2005).  
 
 
Relaxing the assumption of uniformity among workers in a competitive labor market, 
we  may  consider  that  innate  or  acquired  unobservable  quality  differences  exist  between 
workers. These abilities may allow them to select appropriate industries, (Murphy and Topel, 
1990; Maurin and Goux, 1999). High quality workers will choose for example industries with 
higher quality returns. Employers, at the other side, may practice segregation by ability in the 
selection process in order to choose workers of uniform productivity (Groshen, 1991). Such 
segregation could be related to the ability-sensitivity of the employer’s technology. In fact, 
according  to  Groshen  (1991),  employers  with  ability-sensitive  technologies  hire 
disproportionately more high-ability workers and, thus, pay higher wages
v. Hence, quality 
differentials between industries can give rise to wage differentials.  
 
Industry wage premium may also compensate for differences in job attributes across 
industries such as undesirable working conditions or risk of layoff… (Brown, 1980; Topel,   7 
1984;  Krueger  and  Summers,  1987;  Murphy  and  Topel,  1987;  Groshen,  1991).  Industry-
specific  skills  constitute  also  an  explanation  of  inter-industry  wage  differentials.  In  fact, 
industries  may  compensate  workers  for  accumulating  a  particular  set  of  skills  that  are 
essential to the production process (Parent, 2000).  
 
Explanations  presented  above  take  place  without  falsification  of  the  prediction  of 
perfect  competition.  However,  industry  wage  differentials  could  be  also  considered  in  a 
context  of  imperfectly  competitive  labor  markets  (Krueger  and  Summers,  1988).  In  such 
cases, the efficiency wages theories are invoked as rationale. These theories postulate that 
some  employers  may  maximize  profits  by  paying  workers  a  premium  above  the  market-
clearing wage. The payment of noncompetitive wages is primarily motivated by an increase in 
productivity that has three main sources: the minimization of turnover if turnover costs are a 
decreasing function of the wages firm pays (Salop, 1979), the encouragement of workers good 
performance by increasing the job loss cost (Bulow and Summers, 1986) and the attraction of 
high quality workers when applicant’s quality is  not  directly observable (Krueger, 1988). 
Since differences in firms’ ability to sustain the costs of turnover, to supervise workers and to 
measure  labor  quality  exist  because  of  differences  in  the  technology  of  production  or  in 
management capacity, firm wage differentials and by aggregation industry wage differentials 
may occur.  
 
The existence both of rents to the firms and of employee bargaining power that is 
consistent across occupations may also lead to produce industry wage variation (Groshen, 
1991). The reasons explaining that firms accept to confer rents on workers are related to 
efficiency wages theories. We can cite the considerations of motivation, morale, stability and 
higher productivity (Katz et al, 1989).  
 
3.   Trade liberalization and industry wage premiums 
 
   8 
Trade liberalization could affect industry wage differentials both under perfect and 
imperfect competition. Most discussion of such impact in a context of perfectly competitive 
product  and factor markets  is  based on the specific factors model that assumes  short-run 
immobility  of  labor.  Considering  a  developing  country  with  two  sectors  (say  textile  and 
electronics) and three types of labor: a skilled labor specific to the textile sector, an unskilled 
labor specific to  the electronics  sector
vi and a labor of general use which is mobile, this 
framework predicts that trade liberalization will increase the real return to the factor specific 
to the sector that observes an increase in its relative price, namely unski lled workers. On the 
other hand, we will observe a decrease of the real return to skilled labor
vii. This may 
contribute to reduce wage inequality. The impact on the third category of labor is ambiguous 
and will depend on its consumption pattern.  
 
Introducing imperfect competition in product and factor markets introduces additional 
channels through which trade liberalization impacts industry wage premiums. According to 
Rose  (1987),  regulatory  protectionism  could  be  a  source  of  rents  creation.  Thus,  in  the 
presence of workers bargaining power, protectionism could generate industry wage premiums 
that  tend  to  be  reduced  or  completely  eliminated  consequently  to  the  trade  liberalization 
process. If unskilled-labour intensive sectors register relatively higher tariff cuts, we would 
expect trade-induced wage premiums changes in these sectors to deteriorate unskilled workers 
relative  income.  This,  in  turn,  affects  negatively  wage  inequality.  It  is  also  possible  that 
unions extract the rents associated with protection in the form of employment guarantees 
rather than higher wages (McDonald and Solow, 1981). This may be the case if we consider a 
model assuming seniority-based layoff rules, where senior workers are more interested in 
higher  wages,  while  junior  workers  are  seeking  for  preventing  layoffs.  Under  these 
assumptions, Grossman (1987) shows that the impact of trade liberalization depends also on 
the seniority structure of the union.  
   9 
Trade liberalization may also induce productivity changes at the firm level by increasing 
competition, and thus the incentive to innovate, in a protected market dominated by a few 
domestic firms, (Helpman and Krugman, 1989). Empirically, many studies have established a 
positive link between trade reforms and firm productivity in developing countries (Harrison, 
1994 for Cote d'Ivoire; Krishna and Mitra, 1998, for India, Pavcnik, 2002, for Chile..). If 
productivity enhancements are passed through industry wages, the industries with the higher 
productivity gains due to trade policy reforms will face an increase in their wages.  
A relatively small number of empirical studies have tried to investigate the relationship 
between  industry  wage  premiums  and  trade  protection.  Studying  the  Colombian  case, 
Attanasio  et  al.  (2004)  find  that  workers  employed  in  industries  with  the  largest  tariff 
reductions  experienced  a  decline  of  their  wages  relative  to  the  economy-wide  average. 
Moreover, it seems that these sectors had the highest shares of unskilled workers and the 
lowest wages prior to trade reforms. Thus, trade policy has contributed to deteriorate wage 
dispersion. Controlling for unobserved sector heterogeneity through industry fixed effects, 
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) find, for Colombia, a positive relationship between tariffs and 
industry wage premiums. This finding is consistent with the existence of industry rents that 
are  reduced  by  trade  liberalization,  or  alternatively  with  the  predictions  of  the  short  and 
medium-run  models  of  trade,  in  which  labor  is  immobile  across  sectors.  For  Mexico, 
Feliciano  (2001)  shows  that  trade  reforms  affected  industry  wage  differentials  only  by 
reducing license coverage. Investigating a differentiated impact depending on education level, 
the author does not observe a disparity between the ability to capture rent of workers with 0-
11 years of schooling and those with more than 12 years of schooling. However, according to 
Feliciano  (2001),  since  the  most  affected  industries  are  unskilled  labor-intensive,  trade 
reforms had a greater impact on their wages.    10 
The results of Mishra and Kumar (2005), for India, suggest that in sectors with largest 
tariff reductions, wages increased relative to the economy-wide average. These findings are 
consistent  with  liberalization induced-productivity increases  at  the firm-level.  The authors 
consider that trade liberalization has contributed to decrease wage inequality in India.  
 
 
Developing a model of labor demand which allows for imperfect  competition and 
endogenous technological change in order to estimate the effect of trade reform in Morocco 
on firm-level employment and wages, Currie and Harrison (1997) show that non exporting, 
private sector firms reacted mainly by raising productivity and cutting profit margins, which 
explains the lack of employment adjustments in that sector.  
 
 
Finding similar insignificant industry employment effects of trade reforms in Mexico, 
Revenga (1997) focuses on the role of rent sharing. The author adopted a flexible model of 
wage  setting  that  accommodates  both  rent-sharing  behavior  and  competitive  wage 
determination. Results show that trade reforms reduced the rents available to be captured by 
firms and workers. Revenga gives also evidence that skilled workers were previously better at 
capturing these rents, which suggests that the industry wage premium channel is likely to have 
contributed  to  moderate  the  wage  inequality  increase  in  Mexico  after  the  start  of  trade 
liberalization process.  
 
4.  Rent sharing: an explanation for small employment responses to trade 
Liberalization?  
 
The  dominant  conclusion  of  the  empirical  literature  exploring  labor  market 
adjustments  to  trade  reforms  in  developing  countries  reveals  that  employment  effects  are 
minor, [Krueger (1983), Currie and Harrison (1997), Revenga (1997)].  Many reasons for this 
apparent divergence between theoretical predictions and empirical evidence are invoked. We 
may cite the restrictive labor market regulations (Revenga, 1997) and the inappropriateness of   11 
the Hekscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) prediction of intersectoral reallocation in a context the 
intra-industry trade in intermediate products, (Hoekman and Winters, 2005). Furthermore, 
Currie and Harrison (1997) and Revenga (1997) emphasize the ability of firms facing import 
competition to react by cutting profit margins
viii and industry rents in a situation of imperfect 
product and labor markets. Regarding the last hint, we should note the scarcity of empirical 
studies  that  model  the  effects  of  openness  on  wages  and  employment  integrating  the 
assumption of rent sharing between workers and shareholders. We  may cite  Abowd and 
Lemieux (1993) for Canada, Revenga (1997) for Mexico and Cassoni and Labadie (2001) for 
Uruguay. Two different bargaining frameworks are generally specified in this context. First, a 
“right-to-manage” model is considered when we assume that firms and unions bargain over 
the  wage  in  presence  of  product  market  rent.  Then,  firms  set  the  level  of  employment 
unilaterally. The higher wages that will result from the bargain increase marginal costs and 
hence  reduce  employment.  In  this  type  of  model,  employment  level  is  lower  due  to 
imperfections  in  both  the  product  market  and  the  labour  market  (Geroski  et  al.,  1996). 
According  to  Cassoni  and  Labadie  (2001),  the  “right-to-manage”  model  is  particularly 
interesting  when  collective  wage  negotiations  take  place  at  the  industry  level.  This  is 
explained by the difficulty to bargain over employment at firm level, at least simultaneously. 
The second model is the “efficient bargaining” model. This model assumes that unions and 
employers bargain over both wages and employment
ix which means as pointed out by Cassoni 
and Labadie (2001) that employment stability is explicitly included in the bargaining agenda. 
This model is adequate when collective agreements exist at the firm -level. The higher the 
concern of unions about job stability, the lower the wage level and the higher the employment 
level bargained.  
 
          Considering  a  “right-to-manage”  model,  Revenga  (1997)  assumes  that  changes  in 
industry-level trade protection affect firm-level wages through the reduction of sector rents   12 
and hence, through the reduction of the rent component of wages in firms where workers are 
able to exert a bargaining power. Similarly, yet under both types of contracts, Abowd and 
Lemieux (1993) consider that quasi-rents per worker are a “sufficient statistic for the effect of 
product market conditions
x on the firm's ability to pay”. 
 
 The nature of wages and employment adjustments depends on the nature of the wage 
setting mechanism itself (Revenga, 1997). If wages contain a rent component, workers may 
accept  to  reduce  wages  to  preserve  jobs.  However,  in  case  of  high  seniority  level  of 
employees or important proportion of permanent workers, they may choose to maintain a high 
level of wages for those who remain employed, at the expense of those who lose their jobs. 
Finally, if workers do not benefit from a significant bargaining power, wage and employment 
responses will be largely dominated by developments in the industry labour market.  
 
Interestingly, when conducting their empirical analysis, Cassoni and Labadie (2001) 
adopt  the  two  bargaining  models  to  characterize  the  behaviour  of  the  Uruguayan 
manufacturing firms over the period 1985-1999. The authors opt for this approach because 
unions  in  Uruguay  started  bargaining  at  a  more  decentralised  level  in  the  nineties  and 
included in their negotiations employment and work conditions, concomitantly with the trade 
liberalization initiated in 1992-1993. Applying the “right-to-manage” model over the period 
1985-1991, Cassoni and Labadie (2001) demonstrate that in the late eighties, strong unions 
managed to get a higher proportion of the protection-induced rents. Then, over the period 
1991-1999,  results  deriving  from  an  “efficient  bargaining”  model  suggest  that  unions 
developed different mechanisms of adjustments to the trade openness across industries that 
allowed to alleviate the employment effects. Indeed, they moderate their wage demands and 
in some industries allowed wages to fall.  
 
Studying the impact of trade liberalization on employment and wages in the Mexican 
manufacturing  sector  using  a  “right-to-manage”  framework,  Revenga  (1997)  shows  that   13 
unions were able to capture part of the rent generated by tariffs but not those generated by 
quota  protection.  The  author  comments  as  following  firms’  response  to  trade  openness: 
“When rents are dissipated due to a decline in tariffs, the union’s bargained wage adjusts, 
dampening  the  needed  employment  responses.  When  rents  disappeared  because  of  quota 









5.1  The Tunisian Trade Liberalization Process 
 
 
Tunisia initiated a structural adjustment plan in 1986 that signed the start of the trade 
liberalization process. It entailed a process of lowering and setting uniform tariffs such that 
the average import duties declined from 41% in 1986 to 33% in 1987 and to 29% in 1990
xii. 
The highest duty rate was reduced from 200% to 43% (Mouelhi, 2007). The ERP relative to 
all outputs excluding Hydrocarbon fell from 70% in 1986 to 44% in 1990. Trade reform 
pattern was not uniform across manufacturing industries over the period 1986 -1991. For 
instance,  unskilled  intensive  sectors  as  the  food -processing  and  textile  industries  that 
benefited from a relatively higher protection level prior to trade liberalization observed a 
decrease  of  their  effective  protection  rates  by  about  300  and  150  percentage  points 
respectively. However, skill intensive sectors underwent either an increase of their rate of 
protection or a minor decrease within the same period. For instance, the ERP shifted from 
40% to 82% in construction materials, glass and ceramics industry and from 88% to 101% in 
the electrical and mechanical industries. Concerning the chemical industries, the ERP moved 
from 88% to 78% between 1986 and 1991. Overall, skill intensive industries were less 
protected prior to the reforms. Therefore, they were subject to smaller reductions in tariff 
protection. Similar patterns of protection are reported in Colombia ( Attanasio et al, 2004), 
Mexico (Hanson and Harrison, 1999) and Morocco (Currie and Harrison, 1997).  In 1990,   14 
Tunisia signed the GATT agreements. The adherence to the WTO was achieved in 1995. 
Reflecting  the  government’s  objective  to  comply  with  the  GATT/WTO  negotiated  rates, 
Tunisia witnessed over the period 1990-1998 an increase in the nominal protection rates on 
agricultural  final  goods  because  of  non-tariff  protection  transformation.  The  nominal 
protection rates on industrial final goods increased for the same reason while the nominal 
protection rates on industrial intermediate goods decreased due to the focus of the openness 
process at this stage on equipments and inputs. This led to an increase of the effective rate of 
protection for a majority of products (the ERP attained 56% in 1995 and 71% in 1998). The 
trade liberalization process has become more active since 1997 given that the effective rate of 
protection decreased from 71% to 49% in 2002.  




There  are  many  reasons  to  expect  that  employees  in  developing  countries  exert  a 
bargaining  power  so  as  to  share  rents  with  their  employers.  First,  relatively  strict  labour 
market legislation characterizing these countries may strengthen the workers’ ability to exert 
wage bargaining pressures (Martins and Esteves, 2006). Second, according to Rusinek and 
Rycx (2008), rent-sharing is not exclusive to unionized sectors if collective agreements are 
extended to non-unionized members. However, as Martins and Esteves (2006) point out, we 
may also identify other reasons supporting the opposite view that employers in developing 
countries are particularly immune to any possible wage bargaining pressures arising from 
their employees.  This  rationale stems  from  a number of studies  by Hanson  and Harrison 
(1999) and Currie and Harrison arguing that in practice developing countries labour markets 
are relatively fluid due to poor compliance with existing regulations such as the minimum 
wages legislation. Therefore, unions in the South are not effectively strong. Furthermore, the 
important size of the informal sector and the high workers turnover make it less easy to 
bargain over rents (Martins and Esteves, 2006).  
   15 
Some features of the Tunisian labour market support the hypothesis of rent sharing 
between employers and employees. First, we can cite the importance of tripartite national and 
sector wage negotiations. These negotiations take place each three years and are performed 
within joint committees bringing together employer and union representatives under the aegis 
of the government. We should note the existence of a unique national workers union “UGTT” 
that has the legitimacy to lead the dialogue with the government and employers organizations. 
UGTT enjoys a great popularity as it actively contributed to Tunisia’s independence. The 
UTICA and the UTAP are the employers organizations related respectively to the trade and 
industry sectors and the agriculture and fishing sectors.  
 
The Tunisian legal system imposes to bargaining agents to negotiate primarily at the 
sector  level.  Firms  not  enclosed  in  sector  agreements  are  not  allowed  to  initiate  wage 
agreements. Ennaceur (2000) points out that even if the labour code permits to conclude firm-
level agreements, in practice wage negotiations are generally centralized at the national and 
sector level. Rusinek and Rycx (2008) note that firm agreements complementing industry 
agreements may lead to broaden the scope of rent sharing as the workers possibly represented 
by  trade  unions  may  align  their  requirements  to  the  specificities  of  the  establishment. 
However,  Tarchouna  (1999)  explains  that  the  UGTT  generally  prefers  industry-wide 
bargaining in the context of abundant and precarious unskilled labour as well as important 
proportion of small-size firms. Indeed, conducting collective bargaining at the highest level of 
the  Trade  union  hierarchy  increases  the  ability  to  exert  pressure  on  the  employers’ 
organizations.  
The second feature is the high level of unionization (20%)
xiii relatively to developed 
countries standards. However, this rate varies across firms depending on whether they are 
private or public. Indeed, sectors dominated by public investments register a high level of 
unionization (railway 67%, electricity 65% and mining 71%) while the textile sector that   16 
accounts for a significant number of private firms registers 7% of union adherents among its 
workers
xiv. Yet, even in case of low level of unionization, workers may capture a large part of 
the rents that firms earn (Katz et al., 1989) by creating informal organizations (Dunlop, 1957), 
by exerting a union-threat effect (Dickens, 1986) and by taking advantage of their role as 
firm-specific human capital, (Lindbeck and Snower, 1987). Geroski et al. (1996) conclude on 
the basis of plant level evidence that mark-ups are not exclusively captured by unions, which 
implies that reductions in union power may decrease but would not remove wage premia.  
 
 
6.  Empirical analysis 
 
   6.1   The empirical strategy 
 
 
The empirical analysis is performed in two steps. First, we explore the link between real 
wages  and  trade  protection-induced  firms’  quasi-rents.  We  seek  to  identify  whether  a 
mechanism of rent-sharing between employers and employees exist and we attempt to explore 
its impact on wage disparities. For this purpose, we adopt following Revenga (1997) and 
Abowd and Lemieux (1993) a flexible model of wage setting that allows for both the presence 
of rent-sharing and competitive wage determination. As the rent-sharing behaviour may affect 
employment responses to external shocks, the second step of this analysis addresses the issue 
of trade liberalization impact on labour demand. The objective is to draw a global picture 
about  the  adjustment  mechanisms  of  Tunisian  firms  to  the  intensification  of  foreign 
competition.  If results reveal that rent is a wage component, we may expect an inhibited 
employment reaction. The model considered at the second step is a model of employment 
determination which incorporates trade effects and allows for desegregation of the labour 
demand depending on skill, following Mouelhi (2007).  
 
 
6.2  The rent-sharing model 
 
We consider like Abowd and Lemieux (1993) and Revenga (1997) a right-to-manage 
model as it is the most adequate with respect to the Tunisian bargaining system (See stylized   17 
facts above). We assume that the firm and the union bargain only over wages. Then, the firm 
sets unilaterally employment at the level that maximizes its profit, given the negotiated wage 
rate. The Nash solution presented by Abowd and Lemieux (1993) to this bargaining problem 











: w  the wage outcome   
 
i  : The bargaining power parameter for the workers in firm i.  
:
U w The union’s preferred wage outcome.  
:
A w The alternative wage (the wage in the corresponding industry), which represents also the 
competitive wage.  
 
If  i  =0, workers don’t exert any bargaining power in the firm. Wages are determined by 
external labor market conditions.  
If  i  0, workers are able to capture rents. This will drive a wedge between the wage set in 
the firm and the competitive outcome. 
 
 
Equation (1) is seen by Revenga (1997) as a flexible model of wage setting that allows for 
both rent-sharing behavior and competitive wage determination. Hence, it may account for the 
heterogeneity in bargaining power across firms. 
It is possible to express equation (1) as:  
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The  objective  here  is  to  estimate  the  bargaining  power  parameter .  However,  this  is 
somewhat difficult since the union’s preferred wage outcome W
U is not observed. If it was 




it W W   could be seen as a summary measure of the state of the product market 
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To overtake this problem, Abowd and Lemieux (1993) and Revenga (1997) use a different 
approach.  They  model  the  wage  outcome  as  a  function  of  the  quasi-rent  per  worker  QR 
evaluated at the settlement wage W and of the industry wage W
A, as follows:  
 
                                                  
A
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
~ is defined as a quasi-rent-splitting parameter that determines how much of the quasi-rent is 
captured by the union. It can be interpreted as a lower bound to the estimates of   that would 
be obtained by regressing equation (3), if W
U was observed.    
Assuming heterogeneity in worker’s bargaining power leads to the following expression of 
equation (4), with the average bargaining power parameter across firms:  
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1   and  
 
Estimating the average parameter   will give us a measure of workers ability  to capture 
product market rents within firms’ sample.  
Following  Revenga  (1997)  and  Abowd  and  Lemieux  (1993),  quasi  rents  per  worker  are 
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Where VAit is value added, Lit total firm employment and
A
it w is the alternative (industry) wage. 
The quasi-rent is assumed to be positive.  
 Trade liberalization is likely to imply a reduction in sector rents. In this framework, 
such  impact  would  be  captured  by  changes  in  quasi-rents  per  worker  at  the  firm  level 
(Revenga,  1997).  At  the  same  time,  the  error  component  in  equation  (5)  is  likely  to  be 
correlated with the regressor QR (Wit). Using instrumental variables estimates would yield to 
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obtain consistent  estimates  of   . Abowd and Lemieux (1993) point out the necessity to 
“instrument  the  quasi-rent  using  an  external  shock,  or  a  natural  experiment,  that  hits  the 
industry independently of the behaviour of both firms and unions”
xv. In our case, changes in 
trade protection would be relevant instruments for the endogenous quasi-rent variable as they 
may reflect exogenous demand shocks. Furthermore, relying on these instruments help to 
achieve  the  purpose  of  this  empirical  analysis  which  is  to  assess  the  impact  of  trade 
liberalization  on  changes  in  the  rent  component  of  wages,  and  consequently  on  skilled-
unskilled wage gap. In this paper, considered instruments are customs duties collected relative 
to imports and the effective rate of protection. Given that they are industry level proxies of 
trade policy changes, they are likely to be exogenous to the firm, yet correlated with firm-
level  quasi  rents
xvi. The relevance of these instruments is tested using the Sargan test of 
overidentifying restrictions.   
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Where TPj is a vector of industry trade-protection variables and σi captures fixed effects.    
 
 
To compute the different variables of this model, we employ firm-level data
xvii taken 
from the national annual survey report on firms (NASRF) performed by the Tunisian National 
Institute of Statistics (TNIS) over  the period 1997-2002. After the elimination of extreme 
outliers as well as data corresponding to the year 1997
xviii and confining our attention to firms 
that remain in the sample for at least three years
xix, we have obtained an unbalanced panel 
consisting of a sample of 635 firms from 12 sectors.  The data include a large set of variables 
about value added (VA), number of workers (L), capital st ock (K), sales, expenditures 
disaggregated by equipment type, tangible and intangible fixed assets. In addition, two sector 
industrial price indexes are provided, respectively elaborated from 20 and 50 products lists.   20 
We should also note that the database offers a labour decomposition by skill. Skilled labour 
activities include engineering, management, administration, and general office tasks while the 
activities  of  unskilled  workers  include  machine  operation,  production  supervision,  repair, 
maintenance and cleaning
xx. Besides, data on the total wage bill are available, though, without 
skill distinction. This is unfortunate, since these data are essential to the current study. In 
order to overtake this problem, we followed  the  decomposition  technique  of  Maurin  and 
Parent (1993) to decompose the total wage bill by skill, given the skilled and unskilled shares 
on total employment
xxi. Besides, we computed a capital stock proxy since the available data 
provided by the TNIS for this variable regard a small balanced sample. We followed Mairesse 
and Hall (1996) by  considering the tangible fixed assets deflated by the gross fixed capital 
formation deflator as a capital stock proxy. The wage outcome w is computed as the average 
real wage for a firm i at time t
xxii. The alternative or “outside” wage is computed as the 
average real wage in the industry following Abowd and Lemieux (1993) and Revenga (1997). 
The quasi-rent per worker is constructed as shown in equation (6) using data on firms’value 
added (VA)  and number of workers  (N) directly provided by this  database.  Finally,  trade 
measures such us imports relative to the value added, customs duties relative to total imports 
and effective rate of protection are sector-level data and are provided by the Tunisian Institute 











We start the empirical analysis by exploring the importance of rent sharing in wage 
determination. For this purpose, we first present in Table 1 “within” estimates of equation (5) 
that links firm-level wages to quasi rents per worker. We then perform instrumental variables 
estimations of the rent sharing equation (7). Results reported in columns (1) to (3) of Table 1 
show a positive and strongly significant relationship between real annual wage and quasi-rent 
per worker that is robust to the inclusion of year effects. This indicates that rent sharing is an   21 
important component of wage determination in Tunisia. In column (3), we incorporate as 
Abowd  and  Lemieux  (1992)  and  Revenga  (1997)  an  interaction  term  QR*[QR-  average 
(QR)]. This term measures the deviation of firm-level quasi-rents from the sample average. 
Converging with Abowd and Lemieux (1992), results suggest a negative and significant effect 
of this term at the 1% level. This means that that the share of quasi-rents captured by the 
union
~
*QR is inversely proportional to the size of the quasi-rent expressed by the interaction 
term. This implies that unions extract a large share of quasi-rent from less profitable firms and 
a smaller share from more profitable ones. Therefore, in the Tunisian case also, empirical 
evidences seem to confirm that bargaining workers do not perfectly price discriminate among 
firms. These findings are in line with the hypothesis that unions may set a similar wage for 
firms related to the same sector which is likely to occur given the existence of sector wage 
agreements in Tunisia. The coefficient on the capital to value added ratio is positive and 
significantly different from zero in all specifications. This implies that, holding other firm 
characteristics  constant,  firms  that  have  larger  capital  stock  also  accord  to  their  workers 
higher  wages.  The  coefficient  on  the  industry  real  wage  (alternative  wage)  is  highly 
significant. Hence, firm wages seem to be also driven by industry labour market features.  
 
The double least squares (2SLS) regressions derived from equation (7) are reported in 
Table 2. Year and individual fixed effects are added to control respectively for business cycle 
effects and disparities in wage effects across firms. Columns (1) and (2) present the first stage 
estimates while columns (3) and (4) present the second stage estimates. Instruments used for 
the endogenous quasi-rent variable are respectively the ratio of customs duties to imports and 
the effective rate of protection. We favour these instruments to conventional trade measures 
like the ratio of imports to sector value added and the ratio of exports to value added. Indeed, 
we are more interested in capturing trade protection strategy than trade outcomes. We also   22 
incorporate interaction variables that permit to trade policy effects to vary with the proportion 
of skilled workers in the firm labour force. 
 
Insert TAB. 1 here 
 
 
The first stage estimates do not reveal significant potential effect of trade protection on 
firms’ wages when we consider the coefficients on trade protection. Nevertheless, the notable 
feature  of  the  results  is  that  the  composition  of  the  workforce  appears  to  be  relevant  in 
considering firm’s wage effects. In fact, they clearly reveal that the greater the portion of 
skilled workers in the firm, the more trade protection increases the quasi-rent per worker. One 
plausible explanation, already invoked by Revenga (1997), is that skilled workers are better 
able to extract or capture rents in a skill-scarce country. However, in Tunisia, their bargaining 
power is likely to be exerted primarily through informal channels rather than unionization, 
given that only 24% of UGTT leaders are college graduates in 2004
xxiii. The second stage 
estimates show positive and statistically significant coefficients on quasi rent per worker in 
both specifications. They are also larger than those deduced by within estimates. The Sargan 
test applied confirms the relevance of the instruments used. The Hausman test rejects the null 
hypothesis of the independence of the residuals with the instrumented variable for all the 
specifications presented. The coefficient on the capital to value added ratio is robust to 
estimators change as it conserves a positive and statistically significant sign.  
 
 
Insert TAB. 2 here 
 
  Firms distinction by skill intensity 
 
In order to make robustness checks, we consider two types of firms distinguished by 
skill intensity. Skill-intensive firms are those whose skilled/unskilled employment ratio is 
above the median. Columns (1) and (3) in Table 3 report respectively within estimates and 
two stage least squares estimates for skilled labour-intensive firms while columns (2) and (4) 
consider  the  same  specifications  for  unskilled-labour  intensive  firms.  The  Hausman  test 
Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%. All variables are in ln form  
   23 
confirms the independence of the error term and the quasi-rent per worker, which leads to 
favour the two stage least squares estimates. Results suggest that the decrease of quasi-rent 
due to trade liberalization is associated, for both types, with a decrease in real wages. The 
industry rent is therefore a channel through which skill-intensive as well as unskilled-labour 
intensive  firms  facing  increased  foreign  competition  are  likely  to  adjust.  However,  the 
magnitude of the wage response is higher for the former. 
 
Insert TAB. 3 here 
 
 
  Quasi-rent per worker and wage inequality  
 
 
In order to assess the role of quasi-rent in wage inequality evolution which is the main 
attempt of this paper, we regress the ratio of skilled workers to unskilled workers total wage 
bills on the quasi-rent per worker variable, the alternative industry wage and the capital on 
value added ratio. The first variable is our measure of wage inequality. Table 4 shows that the 
coefficient on the quasi-rent is positive, strongly significant and robust to changes in firms’ 
type.  A  decrease  in  quasi-rent  due  to  trade  openness  is  related  to  a  decrease  in  wage 
disparities. This result seems to be unexpected at first glance if we refer to some empirical 
studies that do not take into consideration workers heterogeneity in bargaining power. Our 
findings in section 6.3 reveal that rent sharing was conditional to the proportion of skilled 
workers in the firm. This category seems to have been the most able to exert pressure on 
employers and extract the available rent. Therefore, it is also the category most affected by 
trade policy changes. However, we should also note that other factors intervene in the net 
impact of trade liberalization on wage inequality like trade-induced skill-biased technological 
progress that is likely to increase the relative demand of skilled workers and thus, contributes 
to the widening of wage disparities between skilled and unskilled workers.  
 
Insert TAB. 4 here 
   24 
6.4  Employment determination model 
   
In the light of the results displayed in the previous section, we may expect that the rent 
sharing mechanism may have buffered potential firm employment variations that are likely to 
occur due to openness chocks. In order to gauge this hypothesis, we consider a model of 
employment determination which incorporates trade effects and allows for desegregation of 
the labour demand depending on skill, following Mouelhi (2007).  
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The dependent variable is the employment level. Explanatory variables are respectively, 
the initial employment level 1  it L , the firm value added it y , the capital stock it K  and a trade 
protection measure it TP  which is the ratio of custom duties on imports. The average real wage 
associated to each skill category (skilled and unskilled workers) is noted respectively WQ and 
WNQ. These variables are time invariant in our case. Time effects t  and fixed effects i  are 
included to capture the impact of omitted variables that are specific to a year t or a firm i. In 
fact,  there  is  a  delay  between  demand  chocks  and  firm’s  level  of  employment 




Equation  (8)  specifies  a  dynamic  model  in  that  it  includes  the  lagged  dependent 
variable 1  it L as an explanatory variable. The presence of this variable in the right-hand side 
makes inconsistent the classical estimators since it is correlated, by construction, with the 
error  term.  Empirical  literature  relies  in  such case  on  the  system  Generalized  Method  of 
moments  (GMM)  estimator  suggested  by  Arellano  and  Bond  (1998).  This  estimator  is   25 
deduced from a system of equations in first differences and in levels. It allows controlling for 
omitted invariant variables and corrects for the potential endogeneity of some explanatory 
variables.  Lagged first differences are used as instruments for equation in levels and lagged 









The empirical results based on system GMM estimates of equation (8) are reported in 
table 5. Columns (1) and (2) report the results for the estimation of equation (8) with the total 
labour demand as dependent variable. We assume that output, capital stock and lagged labour 
demand are predetermined given that shocks to labour demand in period t-1 could affect the 
level of the output and capital in period t. Therefore, the instruments used for equations in 
first differences are observations of capital, labour and output, dated (t-2) and earlier. Trade 
protection, year dummies and real wages are treated as exogenous variables. We report the 
results of the Sargan test that checks for the validity of instruments used. We also consider a 
test  of  no-serial  autocorrelation  that  examines  whether  the  residual  of  the  regression  in 
differences is second-order serially correlated. In all specifications, these tests give evidence 
for,  respectively,  the  pertinence  of  instruments  used  and  the  absence  of  second-order 
autocorrelation. The test of hypothesis 1   that adjustment costs are null rejects it at the 1% 
level of significance in all columns. This confirms the interest to use a dynamic specification 
for the employment equation. Results in columns (1) and (2) suggest that the coefficient on 
the lagged dependent variable is about 0.85 which means that firms adjust only 15% of their 
deviations from the optimality in one year and confirms the existence of important labour 
reallocation  costs  in  Tunisia.  Besides,  it  converges  with  the  findings  of  Mouelhi  (2007) 
relatively to the period 1983-1994.  The coefficient on the output variable which controls 
notably for business cycle fluctuations is positive and statistically significant. This means that 
an increase in output raises the labour demand. The coefficient on customs duties to imports   26 
appears to be statistically insignificant even after controlling for skilled and unskilled workers 
real wages in column
xxv (2).  
 
 
Distinguishing two types of labour depending on skill in columns (3) and (4) does not 
reveal differences in employment response to the trade liberalization shock. In columns (5) 
and (6), we consider respectively the labour demand in skill-intensive and unskilled-labour 
intensive  firms  as  a  dependent  variable.  The  latter  is  likely  to  observe  an  increase  in 
employment consequently to trade liberalization. Indeed, a decrease of the customs to imports 
ratio by 10% leads to an increase of the labour demand in unskilled-intensive firms by about 
2%. These results are in line with those of Mouelhi (2007)  demonstrating that unskilled-
labour  intensive  firms  in  Tunisia  used  other  means  of  adjustment  than  that  of  cutting 
employment, as productivity improvement. Our findings also coincide with the predictions of 
the Heckcher-Ohlin model that imply an increase in labor demand in these exportable sectors 
due to trade liberalization. However, skill intensive importable sectors, in our case, do not 
show statistically significant labour demand variation; while we expect that they are impacted 
by trade policy reforms through several channels (trade-induced skill biased technological 
change, reallocation effects consistent with the neoclassical trade theory...).  
 
Linking these findings with results of section 6.3 relative to wage adjustments, we 
may deduce that skill-intensive Tunisian firms’ response to trade policy changes transited 
mainly through quasi-rent reduction. The ability of skilled workers to capture the available 
rent  during  trade  protection  allowed  them  to  buffer  the  employment  variation  under  the 
liberalization shock by accepting wage reductions after quasi-rent dissipation. On the other 
hand,  unskilled-labour  intensive  firms  adjusted  using  two  different  mechanisms.  They 
increased labour demand and decreased the quasi-rent per worker. The muted employment 
response with regard to skilled workers category is also explained by a relatively lower speed   27 
of adjustment suggesting that adjustment costs constituted a significant impediment to their 
mobility. 
Insert TAB. 5 here 
7.  Conclusion  
 
This article presented micro-level evidence related to the impact of the rent component 
of the industry wage premium on real and relative wages in Tunisian firms. It appears that 
rent-sharing is an important feature of the wage determination mechanism. Workers were able 
to capture a relatively large proportion of the rent induced by trade protection. Indeed, the 
quasi-rent splitting parameter which measures how much of this premium was extracted by 
unions is estimated to be on  the order of 75%-90%. However, we should note that rent-
sharing was conditional to the share of skilled workers in the firm. The higher their proportion 
in workforce, the more workers were able to benefit from the protection-induced rent. A 
consequent important finding suggests that a 10% decline in quasi-rent implies a reduction in 
wage disparities between skilled and unskilled labour of about 3.5%, over the period 1998-
2002. This impact being more pronounced in skill-intensive firms.  
 
This relatively important wage response may inhibit employment adjustment. The rent-
sharing mechanism may indeed buffer the trade liberalization shock to the extent that workers 
accept  wage  decrease  to  preserve  existing  jobs.  To  draw  a  global  picture  about  firms’ 
reactions to foreign competition, we complete the first analysis by estimating  a model of 
employment determination, following Mouelhi (2007) which incorporates trade effects and 
allows for desegregation of the labour demand depending on skill. Our findings converge with 
those of Mouelhi (2007) who shows that unskilled-labor intensive Tunisian firms, which are 
export oriented, react to greater competition from abroad by increasing labor demand. In our 
case, a decrease of the custom duties to imports ratio by 10% raises labor demand in these   28 
firms  by  2%  over  1998-2002.  However,  we  do  not  observe  a  statistically  significant 
employment response of skill-intensive firms. 
 
Overall, it appears that skill-intensive Tunisian firms’ response to trade policy changes 
transited mainly through quasi-rent reduction. The ability of skilled workers to capture the 
available rent during trade protection allowed them to absorb the employment variation that 
may occur by accepting wage reductions
xxvi. On the other hand,  unskilled-labour intensive 
firms adjusted using two different mechanisms. They increased labour demand and decreased 
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APPENDIX 
Firm total wage bill decomposition technique of Maurin and Parent (1993)
xxvii :  
 
 
We define the following variables: 
 
: TWB Total wage bill in firm i  
: L Total employment in firm i  
: Q L  Number of firm’s skilled workers.    
: NQ L  Number of firm’s unskilled workers.    32 
: Q l Skilled workers share of total employment relative to a firm i 
: NQ l Unskilled workers share of total employment relative to a firm i 
: WB Average wage bill per worker in firm i 
: Q WB Skilled worker’s average wage bill in firm i 





The (TNIS) firm level database provides firm data on total wage bill, as well as skilled and 
unskilled  workers  employment.  Unskilled  workers  are  considered  as  our  category  of 
reference.  Assuming  that  Q  indexes  the  skilled  workers  category  and  NQ  the  unskilled 
workers category, we obtain the following expression of the average individual wage bill 
relative to a firm i: 
 
NQ NQ Q Q l WB l WB WB
L
TWB
      
  Q NQ Q Q l WB l WB    1  
  NQ NQ Q Q WB WB WB l     
 
Our objective is to estimate skilled and unskilled wage bills, over the period 1998-2002, for 
each firm of the sample provided by the national annual survey report on firms.  
To  this  purpose,  we  regress  the  following  random  coefficient  model  using  the  Swamy’s 
estimator, where  t i   is an error term.  
 




NQi it l WB WB WB WB 
 
    




The parameter β0t corresponds to the average unskilled workers wage bill  NQ WB  relative the 
firm i, for the entire period 1998-2002. Then, given estimated values of β0t and β1t, we may 
deduce the average skilled workers wage bill  Q WB  associated to the firm i, for the entire 
period 1998-2002. Note here, that this estimation provides only firm heterogeneity: we do not 
obtain estimates for each year of our observation period. To this aim, we multiply average 
firms’ wage bills corresponding to each category of workers by the corresponding workers’ 
numbers available for each year. Hence, we find skilled and unskilled total wage bills, for 
each company of the sample and each year of observation. 
(9) 
 
(10)   33 
                                                 
i P.K. Goldberg, N.Pavcnik (2005), “Trade, wages and the political economy of trade protection: evidence from 
the Colombian trade reform”, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 66, p 78. 
ii Martins (2007) defines “rent sharing” as : “referring to a situation in which rents (profits above the level that 
results from paying all factors their market rates) are shared by the firm, at least in some part, with the 
employees of that firm”. 
iii Tunisia is likely to have pursued the same policy (see Section 5). 
iv Even in Mexico, Venables and Van Wijnbergen (1993) show that trade reforms led to significant reductions in 
price-cost margins. 
vEven if Groshen (1991) tries to explain within industry wage differentials (across plants and firms) when 
considering employers  segregation process,  this rationale could be easily extended to the industry level that 
better emphasizes inter-sectoral technologies differences.  
vi These factors cannot move across industries because of high moving costs, for example.  
viiIf we assume that  the textile sector is the one that experiences the largest tariff reductions in developing 
countries (and thus a reduction in its output price) as it is suggested by stylized facts, the specific -factors model 
predicts a decrease of the relative returns to unskilled workers. 
viii The impact on workers’ wages of profit margin reduction depends on the extent to which labor had a market 
power in the pre-liberalization period. If capital did not share rents with labor as it is observed by Currie and 
Harrison (1997) for Morocco, it is forced to bear the largest fraction of adjustment costs after trade reforms.  
ixThe denomination of the model is due to the fact that it is privately efficient for both parties to contract in this 
way. It satisfies the specific preferences of the firm and the union.  
x  Abowd, J A., Lemieux. T. ,  1993.  “The  effects  of  product  market  competition  on  collective  bargaining 
agreements: the case of foreign competition in Canada”, The Quarterly Journal of economics, Vol. 108, No. 4 , 
November, p 986.  
xi  Revenga,  A.,  1997,  “Employment  and  wage  effects  of  trade  liberalization:  the  case  of  Mexican 
manufacturing,” Journal of Labor Economics, Vol 15, No 3, Part 2, S39.  
xii Les Cahiers de L’Institut d’Economie quantitative (IEQ), n°9, Décembre 1991, p 51 
xiii  Ennaceur, M.,2000. « Les syndicats et la mondialisation  : le cas de la Tunisie  », Document de travail 
DP/120/2000, Institut International d’Etudes Sociales, OIT, Gen￨ve, p7. 
xiv Amami. M.M., 2008. “Les syndicalistes tunisiens à l’￩preuve des changements, quelles représentations ? Pour 
quels enjeux identitaires ?”, M￩moire de Master en Anthropologie sociale et culturelle, Institut Supérieur des 
Sciences Humaines de Tunis, Université de Tunis El Manar, Mars.   
xv  Abowd,  J  A.,  Lemieux.  T.,  1993.  “The  effects  of  product  market  competition  on  collective  bargaining 
agreements: the case of foreign competition in Canada”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 108, No. 4 , 
November, p 991.  
xvi It would be more relevant to use in addition, non-tariff barriers measures as the coverage of import licensing. 
Unfortunately, such measures are not available for our period of interest.   
xvii It is the only firm-level database available in Tunisia. 
xviii Data corresponding to 1997 (the beginning date of the survey) suffer from many shortcomings. 
xix This removal is related to the wage bill decomposition technique applied that is presented in the appendix . In 
a random-coefficients model, the number of observations in each panel must be greater than the number of 
regressors (including the constant). Thus, the first step in fitting Swamy's random coefficient model was to drop 
panels with less than three observations. 
xx This is nearly the white-collar/blue-collar workers classification applied by Hanson and Harrison (1995). 
xxi This decomposition technique is presented in the appendix.  
xxii Nominal wages are deflated using an industrial price index elaborated from 50 products list.  
xxiii “Vers un renouveau syndical: diagnostic quantitatif de l’UGTT par ses cadres”, publication du d￩partement 
des études et de la documentation de l’UGTT, Tunis, Novembre 2006, p 21.  
xxivAccording to Mouelhi (2007), the system GMM estimator is based on extra moment restrictions that offer 
efficiency  gains relative to the  Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator (first -difference GMM estimator) and 
permits the identification of the effects of time invariant variables. 
xxv We have also tried to introduce the average real wage in the firm independently of skill distinction. The 
coefficient on trade protection remains insignificant. 
xxvi The absence of employment response in skill -intensive firms raises also the issue of  the existence of labor 
market rigidities in Tunisia that distort reallocation movements . Besides, as reported in columns (5) and (6) of 
Table 6, adjustment costs are likely to be higher for skilled workers than for unskilled workers.  
xxvii Maurin. E et Parent. M.C (1993), « Productivité et coût du travail par qualifications » in « Actes de la 18
ème 
journée des centrales de bilans sur le thème : Croissance, emploi, productivité »,  Association  Française des 






















Note:  Standard errors between parentheses: * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant  
at 1%. The interaction term measures the deviation of firm-level quasi-rents from the sample average.  













  Within estimates 
  Dependent variable : Firm average real wage 
       (1)  (2)  (3) 



















           
    -0.130 
(0.020)*** 









Fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year effects  Yes  No  Yes 
R²(within)  0.22  0.21  0.29 
Observations  2712  2712  2712 
Number of firms  621  621  621 
  Dependent Variable: the ratio of skilled workers to unskilled 
workers total wage bills. 
Overall sample    Skill-intensive 
firms 
Unskilled labour 
intensive firms  
   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Alternative 


































Fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year effects  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  2039  2039  885  1154 
Number of firms  529  529  245  284 
R-squared  0.82  0.82  0.78  0.84 
TAB.1 - Within estimates of firm wage equations 
Note:  Standard errors between parentheses: * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%.The regressions include a constant term. 
TAB. 4 - Quasi rent per worker and wage inequality    2 
 
Note:  Standard errors between parentheses: * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The 
regressions include a constant term. The number of observations is automatically reduced when trade protection 
variables are introduced as instruments. Related data cover mainly firms belonging to manufacturing industries. 









  First stage of 2SLS firm 
wage equation estimates 
Second stage of 2SLS firm wage 
equations estimates 
Dependent variable: quasi 
rent per worker 
Dependent variable: firm average real 
wage 
(1)  (2)  (4)  (5) 














































     
Effective rate of 
protection 
 
     0.151 
  (0.117) 
   





  0.265 
(0.059)*** 
   
Fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  1391  575  1391   
Number of firms  343  185  343  185 
R-squared   0.22  0.18  0.32  0.25 






Effective rate of 
protection 
and  
Effective rate of 
protection*skilled 
share 
   Sargan test of 
overidentifying 
restrictions 
    0.214 
Chi-sq(1) P-
value = 0.64 
1.678 
Chi-sq(1) P-
value = 0.195 
Hausman 
specification test 






TAB. 2 - Results of 2SLS firm wage equations estimates   3 
 
 
Note:  Standard errors between parentheses: * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The regressions include a constant term. The number of observations is automatically reduced when trade 
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 (4) 
Dependent variable : Firm average real wage 
Alternative 
































Fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  958  1180  542  849 
Number of firms  251  258  146  197 






    skilled share 
Custom 
duties/Imports and  
Custom 
duties/Imports* 
       skilled share 
Hausman 
specification test 
    chi2(7) =                                  
17.36        
Prob>chi2=      
0.06 
chi2(7)=       
20.45 
Prob>chi2 =      
0.0047 
Sargan test of 
overidentifying 
restrictions 
      0.011  
Chi-sq(1)    
P-value = 
0.92 
0.007   
Chi-sq(1)    
P-value = 0.93 
R-squared  0.88  0.88  0.26  0.32 
TAB. 3 - Results of 2SLS firm wage equations estimates by firms’ skill intensity   4 
TAB. 5- Employment effects  




































 Note: Standard errors between parentheses: * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.The regressions include a constant term. All 
 variables are in log form.  






(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 







L(-1):lag of log 
employment 
0.847 






















(0.105)*   












Capital stock  -0.029 











Skilled workers Average 
wage  
  -0.006 
(0.031) 
-0.035 









  -.044 
(0.044) 








Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
1
st order serial 
correlation p-level 
0.007  0.004  0.027  0.0000  0.05  0.002 
2
nd order serial 
correlation 
p-level 
0.384  0.380  0.565  0.613  0.352  0.943 
Sargan 
instrumental validity test 
  0.493  0.402  0.103  0.08  0.809  0.143 
Instruments count  21  23  23  23  23  23 
Observations  1417  1417  915  1385  474  943 
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